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NOTES AND COMMENT
In spite of this the Convention may be regarded as a document
of considerable practical and moral significance.
As to its practical value: despite the limitations listed above, it
is estimated that there still remain a considerable number of cases
in which the Convention will serve as the sole means of attaining
the ends of justice. There are still many people who can benefit by
the Convention, and it will enable them to solve long-delayed prob-
lems of marriage, adoption, and property.
The theoretical significance and moral value of the Convention
is still greater. The Conference which adopted the Convention was
the first conference of states called by the General Assembly of the
United Nations itself, and the Convention was the first within the
framework of the United Nations, the subject of which did not fit
into the customary classifications of United Nations' problems. The
declaration of death of missing persons would appear to be strictly
a problem in private law.'1 4
The Convention thus constitutes a first step in various direc-
tions. Such first steps may sometimes have but a limited practical
value: their true importance lies in the fact of their being first steps.
In this regard the Convention certainly possesses a far-reaching
moral value. It is a moral tribute paid by the United Nations and
its member states to the victims of hatred and misery, of slave labor,
mass killing and extermination. Looked at from this angle, the
Convention is a grim reminder of the unparalleled tragedies of
modern warfare and of political bias and prejudice. In order to help
survivors of the millions who disappeared in World War II, at least
some measure of international cooperation has been reached in the
Convention. Doubtless this is a step forward sincerely to be wel-
comed.
AwDEw FR=MANN.*
THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF THE U.N. CHARTER
AND LOCAL CoURTs
Introduction
The international law of the past-a system of jural relations
between absolute sovereigns-may be entering upon a new era; one
in which rapid sociological and economic changes are acknowledged
114 See Opening Address by the Assistant Secretary-General, Ivan Kerno, at
the Conference on March 15, 1950. A. Conf. 1/Sr. 1 at 3 (March 15, 1950).
* Doctor Juris and Doctor Rerum Politicarum, University of Budapest
1938; Member of Budapest Bar 1942-48.
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and rights are accorded to individual human beings as well as sov-
ereign states. Responsible for this emerging concept, is the United
Nations Charter which has effected many advances in the substan-
tive law of nations.' Since the United Nations professes to be an
organization formed by "We the peoples of the United Nations," 2 it
seems clear that it is not merely composed of absolutely separate
sovereigns as supposed by Grotius in his formulation of modern inter-
national law.
This concept has provided fertile fields for scholars and
theorists 3 but the question becomes less academic with passing time.
When the United States Supreme Court refers to Charter-given
rights,4 and various inferior courts rely on them as the basis for
direct holdings 6 or even mention them by way of dicta,6 it is fitting
that the status and effect of the Charter in our municipal and consti-
tutional law be examined once again. In this discussion, therefore,
it is proposed to consider the applicable human rights provisions, the
status and applicability of the Charter, court decisions invoking it,
and the treatment it may receive in the future so far as current trends
indicate.
The Charter Provisions
The unprecedented United Nations Conference which convened
at San Francisco on April 25, 1945, brought together the representa-
tives of governments all over the world. They reconciled their diverse
backgrounds and practices and on June 26, 1945 gave to the world
the present United Nations Charter. It was ratified by the Senate
of the United States on July 28, 1945 and became effective on October
4th of the same year when the requisite number of ratifications were
received. 7
Acknowledging the fact that peace means more than freedom
from war, the Charter accounts for the economic and social causes
of unrest, and throughout the document are found provisions promot-
1 "Certain subjects covered by the Charter were not previously covered
by international legislation. . . .The principal of these subjects is that of
human rights." PROC. AMER. SoC'Y INT'L L. 11 (1948).
2 U.N. CHARTER PREA BIE. The actual drafting, however, was done by
. our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the
city of San Francisco...."
3 Urging individual rights in international law, see JEssup, A MODERN LAW
OF N. riONS 137 (1948); LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILu OF RIGHTS
OF MAN (1948) passim.
4 Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 650 (1948) (concurring opinion).
5 Fujii v. California, 217 P. 2d 481 (Cal. 1950); Re Drummond Wren,
1945 0. R. 778, 1945 4 D. L. R. 674 (1945).
6 Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P. 2d 569, 579 (1949).
7 For the background and general structure of the United Nations and its
effect on international law, see Re, International Law and the U.N., 21 ST.
JOHN's L. Rlv. 144 (1947).
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ing human rights and fundamental freedoms.8 The first of these are
found in the Preamble in which the "people" of the United Nations
reaffirm their ". . . faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women ... ." Another is contained in the statement of the Organ-
ization's Purposes and Principles wherein it is pledged, "To achieve
international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . ." 9 Such language
reappears throughout.10 Not only is the Organization itself obli-
gated, but all member states bind themselves to take joint and sep-
arate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement
of its purposes."I To supplement the human rights provisions in the
Charter, the Economic and Social Council, pursuant to Article 68,12
created a Commission for the Promotion of Human Rights. That
Commission drafted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948.'3
The Status of the Charter
There are absolutely no doubts that the United Nations' Charter
is a treaty. Likewise, it is clear that in entering into this treaty our
8 For a commentary on these provisions, see RoBINsoN, HumANi RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDous IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NAToNs
(1948) passim.
9 U.N. CHARTER Art. 1, 1f 3.
10 These purposes are executed in the obligation of the General Assembly
to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ". . . pro-
moting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational,
and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion." U.N. CHARTER Art. 13, lb. This undertaking is reiterated in
Article 55, which, "With a view toward the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights . . . ," declares in
paragraph (c) thereof that the United Nations shall promote "universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
"2U.N. CHARTER Art. 56. Query: Since the pledge is not "to take joint
and separate action and cooperate with the Organization," but is rather to
"take joint and separate action in coaperatioi; %with the Organization," is it
necessary that the Organization initiate the action?
12 This article authorizes the creation of commissions for the performance
of the Council's functions. By Article 62, paragraph 2, the Economic and
Social Council is empowered to ". . . make recommendations for the purpose
of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all."
13 43 AMER. L. INT'L L. Supp. 127 (1949). The Declaration was proclaimed
by the General Assembly "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society
. . . shall strive . . . to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their effective rec-
ognition and observance...."
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Government was well within the scope of its constitutional authority,
for it has long been clear that ". . . the treaty power of the United
States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between our
government and the governments of other nations. ... 14 How-
ever, in order to fully comprehend the impact of the Charter on our
local courts, it must be analyzed in view of the "supremacy clause" 15
of our Federal Constitution which proclaims that all treaties shall
become the supreme law of the land and bind the courts in every
state. The plain words of this constitutional provision have repeat-
edly been confirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court has also held
that a treaty is no less supreme if it regulates the private relations
which are normally within the power of the states, and which, but
for the treaty, would be beyond the control of the National
Government.' 6
A condition precedent to the incorporation of any treaty into our
municipal law is that the treaty in question must be self-executing.17
In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
14 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S.. 258, 266 (1889). The court at page 267
has this to say: "The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in
terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument
against the action of the government or of its departments, and those arising
from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would
not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one
of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without
its consent .... But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is
properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country." See Boyd, The
Expanding Treaty Power, 6 N. C. L. REv. 428 (1928); Harris, Treaties Under
the Constitution and International Law, 54 Dixc. L. Rxv. 417 (1950); Kuhn,
The Treaty-Making Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the Slates, 7 CoL.
L. REv. 172 (1907) ; Lenoir, Treaties and the Supreme Court, 1 U. oF CL L.
REV. 602 (1934) ; Magnusson, Our Membership in the United Nations and the
Federal Treaty-Power Under the Constitution, 34 VA. L. Rav. 137 (1949);
Note, 37 COL. L. Rzv. 1361 (1937).
'5U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, [2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land,; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
16 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 1416 (1920). In 1913 Congress passed
a Migratory Bird Act setting a closed season on the taking of migratory birds.
This Act was held unconstitutional but the same subject was covered in a
treaty entered into between Great Britain and the United States. To carry
out the treaty provisions, Congress passed the Migratory Bird Act of July
3, 1918. It was this Act that was declared constitutional in Missouri v.
Holland. For a criticism of this decision, see Black, Missouri v. Holland-
A Judicial Milepost On the Road to Absolutism, 25 Is. L. REv. 911 (1931).
17 See Henry, When is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MicH. L. RFv. 776
(1929).
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whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the
parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial; and the legislature ,must execute the contract before
it can become a rule for the Court.1
8
Although the Charter in the most indisputable terms shows an
intent to carry out equality in daily living for individual men and
women all over the world, before our courts can apply these human
rights provisions as legal principles, it must be demonstrated that they
have become part of the law of the land, or in other words, that they
are self-executing. A single treaty may contain both kinds of pro-
visions, some of which are, and some of which are not self-
executing.19 There is reason to believe that those parts of the
Charter which deal with the legal capacity, privileges, and immunities
of the United Nations, as set forth in Articles 104 and 105 of the
Charter, are self-executing.2 0 However, apart from the fact that the
decisions which will be discussed hereafter, have so assumed, the
human rights provisions have never received such an interpretation.
Thus it would seem that they require legislative implementation be-
fore-they can become rules for the courts.
Before proceeding to a review of the cases, it is well to ponder
for a moment the jurisdictional limitations found in the Charter itself
which forbids intervention ". . . in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . ,' 21 Wherever
the clause applies, the Organization is powerless to act, but it should
be borne in mind that the words "domestic jurisdiction" are possessed
of no intrinsic or absolute meaning and they are neither self-defining
nor have they ever been given a very precise interpretation. 22 The
limits of the "essentially domestic" jurisdiction of a state are flexible.
Matters which are at one particular time universally considered
within these limits, might at another point of time, be propelled into
the international sphere by a combination of circumstances. That
the area of human rights is one of these matters, there is little doubt2 3
Is Foster v. Nielson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (U. S. 1829).
19Aguilar v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, 318 U. S. 724, 738 (1943).
20 Curran v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 229, 234, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 206,
212 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
21 U.N. CHARTER Art. 2, f 7.2 2 See BENTWICH AND MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CArTER OF THE
UNrrm NArboNs 10-18 (1950); Cohen, Humm Rights Under the United
Nations' Charter, 14 L. & CNTEmP. PROB. 430, 434; Gross, Impact of the
United Nations Upo= Domestic Jurisdiction, 18 DEP'T STATE BULL 259 (1948) ;
Kelsen, Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations, 55 YALE L. J.
997 (1946) ; Note, The "Domestic Jurisdiction" Limitation in the United
Nations' Charter, 47 CoL.. L. Rav. 268 (1947).
23 B. V. Cohen of the American delegation to the General Assembly asserts:
"'We did not consider that the injunction against intervention in domestic
affairs was intended to put an absolute bar on the consideration of matters
relating to human rights in connection with the appropriate consideration of
conditions affecting the friendly relations between states. ...
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However, it is not of pressing importance in the present discussion
because that limitation by its terms circumscribes only the United
Nations and imposes no limitation on the courts of the member
states.
24
The Decisions Dealing With the Human Rights Provisions
When one considers the wide variety of situations in which a
plaintiff might wish to rely on the human rights provisions, it is sur-
prising that the Charter hasn't been placed before local courts much
more often than has actually been the case.25 The first case to be
decided squarely on the rights and immunities granted by the United
Nations' Charter, was Re Drummond Wren.26 In this Canadian case,
a landowner applied to have declared invalid a covenant forbidding
sale of his land "to Jews or persons of objectionable nationality." In
striking down the covenant as repugnant to the Charter, the court
used a technique of the civil law: reasoning by analogy, from statutes
and ascertaining public policy from legislative enactments rather than
from judicial decisions.
In the United States, the first significant mention of the Charter's
human rights provisions came in a concurring opinion of the United
States Supreme Court, which was rendered in a case involving the
"We frankly stated that it was not easy to determine with precision what
constitutes intervention in domestic affairs, or what sort of deliberate and sys-
tematic disrespect of human rights takes a matter out from the realm of
domestic concern and makes it a matter of international concern....
"We did, however, give warning that it was part of statesmanship to pro-
ceed cautiously in the delicate field of human rights and fundamental freedoms
so as to avoid serious repercussion on sensitive domestic policies and strong
reaction against wholesome international efforts in this field." Cohen, supra
note 22 at 434-5. The suppression of civil and religious liberties and the per-
secution of church leaders by Hungary and Bulgaria, and the discrimination
against persons of Indian origin by the Union of South Africa, have been
held not to be "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of those states.
Consider the following: It seems ". . . that the Organization is entitled
to scrutinize . . . the observance of human rights in each member state indi-
vidually. And no member can contend that recommendations on these matters
are beyond the scope of the Organization . . . .The Organization must see
that human rights and fundamental freedoms exist not only on paper, but also
in practice. . . ." BENTWICH1 AND MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 22, at 117.
24 Thus it would seem that the New York Supreme Court in Kemp v.
Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 315, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 680, 686 (1947), was incorrect in
asserting that the "domestic jurisdiction" clause of the Charter made it im-
proper to employ it as a defense in a suit to enforce a restrictive covenant.
25 See Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IoWA L.
REv. 1 (1948).
26 1945 0. R. 778, 1945 4 D. L. R_ 674. See Sayre, United Nations Law,
25 CAN. B. REv. 809, 821 (1947), where the writer states: "... . Re Drammond
Wrea . . . is a landmark case, which ...will be held in honour for the in-
definite future. . . . [It] inevitably gives us a judicial new start .. .for the
vigour and growth of jurisprudence and legal philosophy everywhere."; 59
HARV. L. REv. 803 (1946).
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validity of the Alien Land Law of California.2 7  The Court had
repeatedly held that such legislation violated no constitutional rights,
28
but in Oyania v. California, grave doubts were cast upon its validity.2 9
The case arose when California brought escheat proceedings against
the defendants, an American-born son of Japanese parents and his
alien father, claiming that two parcels of land which the father had
bought for the son had escheated to the state. The statute provided
that an intent to evade its provisions was to be presumed when the
consideration for the land was paid by an ineligible alien. It was
this latter presumption that the majority of the Court found ob-
noxious, and so it was deemed unnecessary to re-examine the consti-
tutionality of the basic provisions, the validity of which the Court
assumed arguendo. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy,
in which Mr. Justice Rutledge joined, after outlining the discrimina-
tory features of the law and examining its embarrassing history,30
added the following:
Moreover, this nation has recently pledged itself, through the United Nations'
Charter, to promote respect for, and observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language, and
religion. The Alien Land law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that
national pledge. Its inconsistency with the Charter, which has been duly rati-
fied and adopted by the United States, is but one more reason why the statute
27 Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 650 (1948) ; see 36 CALIF. L. REv.
320 (1948) ; 42 AmER. J. INT'L L. 475 (1948).
28 E.g., Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258 (1924); Frick v. Webb, 263
U. S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U. S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v.
Webb, 263 U. S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Tompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923)
(leading case). See Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the Fou r-
teenth, Amendment, 35 COL. L. R1;v. 61 (1935) ; McGovney, The Anti-Japanese
Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 7 (1947) ;
Note, Validity of Alien Land Law, 92 L. ED. 281 (1948). From the general
rule of the common law that title to real property must be acquired and passed
according to the lex rei sitae, the doctrine resulted that subject to treaty regu-
lations, the title of aliens to land within the several states is a matter of state
regulation and dependent upon the laws of the state wherein the land is situ-
ated. Applying this doctrine and proceeding on the theory that a state has
the right to preserve the ownership, occupancy, and control of its lands for
the benefit of its citizens, these Alien Land laws were enacted to exclude
aliens ineligible for citizenship from acquiring agricultural land.
2D The Attorney-General of California interpreted the Oyanta case as ending
the utility of the Alien Land Law and said that he thought that if the question
of its validity came before the Court, the justices "no doubt would invalidate
the law as unconstitutional." San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 28, 1948, p. 2,
col. 6, cited in 36 CALIF. L. REv. 320, 324 (1948).
30 ".. . The Alien Land law from its inception has proved an embarrass-
ment to the United States Government. . . . It has overflowed into the realm
of foreign policy; it has had direct and unfortunate consequences on this
country's relations with Japan .... The situation was so fraught with danger
that three Presidents of the United States were forced to intervene. . . . A
Secretarv of State made a personal plea that the passage of the law might
turn Japan into an unfriendly nation." Oyama v. California, note 27 supra,
at 672-3.
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must be condemned. And so in origin, purpose, administration, and effect, the
Alien Land law does violence to the high ideals of the Constitution of the
United States pnd the Charter of the United Nations. 1
Sensing the prevailing attitude, the Oregon Supreme Court
shortly thereafter ruled the Alien Land Law of that state unconstitu-
tional as violative of the equal protection clause.3 2  In addition and
by way of dicta, the court referred to our pledge and treaty obliga-
tions under the Charter. Up to this point, no American court had
yet invoked the human rights provisions as controlling. That re-
mained for a lower California court to undertake in Fujii v.
California.83
The Fujii Case
The plaintiff, a Japanese alien ineligible to citizenship, acting
pursuant to a California statute3 4 prayed that the court determine
whether an escheat had occurred as to real property acquired by
him.3 5  The court held that the provisions of the Alien Land Law,
viewed in light of the fact that expansion by Congress of the classes
eligible for citizenship has left only Japanese aliens ineligible to own
real property and the fact that the restrictions are actually referable
to race or color, are unenforceable because contrary to the letter and
spirit of the United Nations'- Charter. The court indicated that al-
though the law had always been upheld as against charges of uncon-
stitutionality, the Charter, upon ratification, became supreme law and
every state irl the union is required ". . . to accept and act upon the
Charter according to its plain language and its unmistakable purpose
and intent." 36 The court rested its decision entirely on the Charter
and adverted in passing to the Declaration of Human Rights 3 7 which,
in expounding the views of the parties to the Charter, ". . . im-
plements and emphasizes the purposes and aims of the United
Nations .... 8 The Fujii case has provoked considerable comment
in the legal profession and has been both criticized and acclaimed in
turn. While some will feel that the decision heralds the time when
United Nations law will control in relations among peoples and states
31 Oyama v. California, note 27 supra at 673.32 Namba v. McCourt, note 6 supra.
33 Supra note 5.
34 CAL. Conz Civ. P oc. § 738.5.
35 The Alien Land law is to be found in CAx. GEN. LAWs Act 261, as
amended.
36 Fujii v. California, note 5 supra at 486.
37 See note 13 supra.
38 Fujii v. Calioria, note 5 supra at 488. On petition for rehearing which
was denied, Fujii v. California, 218 P. 2d 595 (Cal. 1950), the court made it
clear that it realized that the Declaration was not a treaty and was not of
binding force. It stated that the Declaration was not relied on but was merely
used in emphasis of the Charter. An appeal was filed June 2, 1950.
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everywhere,39 others have criticized the holding as being ". .. based
on a misconception of the human rights provisions ....
It is well settled that the Declaration of Human Rights is not a
treaty and imposes no legal obligations on this country. On the day
before the adoption of the Declaration, the representative of the
United States, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, stated:
* . . My government has made it clear in the course of the development of
the Declaration that it doesn't consider that the economic and social and cul-
tural rights stated in the Declaration imply an obligation on governments to
assure the enjoyment of these rights by direct governmental action. .. 41
But the fact that the Declaration has not been incorporated into our
national law and is in no sense binding, cannot be employed as an
argument against the Fujii holding, for although the opinion con-
tained a passing reference to the Declaration, in denying a petition
for rehearing, it was expressly stated:
. . . we did not place reliance on the Declaration in support of the conclu-
sion reached. There is no intimation in the opinion that the Declaration is a
treaty, for it is not, or that it has any binding force .... 42
Hence, whatever criticism is directed against the holding, must
result from the court's misconstruction of the Charter itself. It is
admitted that the human rights and fundamental freedoms referred to
throughout are nowhere defined in the Charter. Further, it is true
that the Preamble and Article 1, paragraph 3 supra, merely state the
general purposes of the Organization and impose no obligations on
this country to take any specific actions. So, also, Article 55 48 simply
states the ends to be promoted and is in no respect binding on Member
Nations. It would therefore seem that the correctness of the holding
must ultimately rest upon the pledge ". . . to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55." 44 Although the "domestic
jurisdiction" limitation would not inhibit action by courts of signa-
tory states, there must be some legal sanction before the courts should
protect the non-defined rights alluded to in the Charter. Articles 55
and 56 have never been construed as self-executing, nor does the
court in the Fujii case expressly so interpret them. If they are not,
and the Foster v. Nielson 45 doctrine is followed, then the human
rights provisions are not incorporated into our municipal law, and
3 See Sayre. notes 25 and 26 supra.
40 Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44
AuFR. J. INT'L L. 543 (1950). See also Editorial, The United Nations Charter
and the Constitutim, 36 A. B. A. J. 652 (1950).
42 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 751 (1948).
42 Fujii v. California, 218 P. 2d 595, 596 (1950).
43 See note 10 supra.
44 U.N. Cyram Art 56. But see query in note 11 supra.
45 See note 18 supra.
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apart from action taken by Congress to implement them, they are not
for the courts to apply. Regardless of whether one agrees with the
object sought to be accomplished by it, it may be contended that the
California court invoked the Charter provisions prematurely.
The Future
The consequences of the Fujii holding, if affirmed, have been
contemplated with trepidation. It is feared that ". . . it will furnish
a treaty basis . . . for claiming invalidation of state laws that make
any distinction or classification on account of sex, race, color, lan-
guage, property, birth status, political or other opinion." 46 This, it
seems, is an unduly extreme view to take, particularly in the light of
the well established power of Congress to nullify the domestic effect
of treaties by legislation.47 It has also been urged that since Congress
has power to legislate under treaties,48 legislation such as the pro-
posed Federal Fair Employment Practices Act may need no basis
other than the United Nations' Charter as has already been suggested
by the President's Commission on Civil Rights. Such an interpre-
tation of the Charter, it is felt in some circles,49 might produce great
uncertainty and unbalance in our federal and state legal system.
These arguments strongly resemble those propounded against
the Covenant on Human Rights,50 now being drafted by the Human
Rights Commission of the United Nations, and designed to form the
second part of an International Bill of Rights of which the first part
is the Declaration. The Covenant is fundamentally different from the
Declaration as it is designed to be a treaty with self-executing pro-
visions which, when ratified, will unquestionably be supreme law,
paramount to all local law in conflict with it. The Covenant has
provoked considerable discussion- much in its favor,5 1 and much
opposed.
52
46 36 A. B. A. J. 652 (1950).
47 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889). Other methods are
probably available to disencumber ourselves of the domestic effect of treaty
obligations. See CoRwiN, TnE PREsiDENT, OFFICE, AND PowRs 243 (1940).
48 Missouri v. Holland, note 16 supra.
49 See Editorial, 36 A. B. A. J. 652 (1950).
50 The text of the proposed Covenant may be found in 34 A. B. A. J. 910(1948).
51 See, e.g., Hyman, Constitutional Aspects of the Covenant, 14 L. &
CoNTEmp. PROB. 451 (1949) ; McDougal and Leighton, The Rights of Man in
the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 14 L.
& CoNTEMp. PROB. 490 (1949); Menin, The Universal Declaration of Himan
Rights, A Challenge to America, 26 DicrA 122 (1949); Moskowitz, Is the
U.N.'s Bill of Hunman Rights Dangerous? A Reply to President Holman,
35 A. B. A. J. 283 (1949).
52 Holman, An "International Bill of Rights": Proposals Have Dangerous
Implications for U. S. 34 A. B. A. J. 984 (1948) ; Holman, President Hohnan's
Comments on Mr. Moskowitds Reply, 35 A. B. A. J. 228 (1949); Holman,
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At the present we do not deal with the binding Covenant. Of
course, it is to be wished that the principles embodied in the Charter
would be universally assumed as obligatory in the relations amongst
men and governments everywhere. However, unless and until the
human rights provisions are declared self-executing, our courts are
not justified in anticipating such obligations; for, rather than being
supreme law, the Charter provisions are at the most an indication of
the national public policy. They must therefore await legislative ac-
tion for only Congress can properly determine how this Government
is to "cooperate" with the United Nations.
THE BAILEE'S RIGHT TO RECOVER FULL DAMAGES: HISTORICALLY
AND CRITICALLY
A person in possession of personal property has the powers of
an owner as against all the world, save the man with a better right
to possession.' This rule of law has always been applied to allow
takers 2 and finders 3 full damages against third persons who con-
verted or damaged the goods. Their right to recover a sum over
and above their own interest in the chattel is based solely on their
possession. Certainly, any other principle would be "an invitation to
all the world to scramble for possession." 4
There are two different opinions, however, as to what is the
basis of the bailee's right to recover full damages from a third person
tortfeasor. One view is that this right exists because of his posses-
International Proposals Affecting So-Called Human Rights, 14 L. & CoNTEMuP.
PROB. 479 (1949); Rix, Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the
Covenant Under Our Constitution, 35 A. B. A. J. 551 (1949). There has
been comment on the Covenant in almost every issue of the AmERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION JOURNAL since March, 1948. The arguments against the Covenant
may be summed up in three points.
1. It is an invasion of the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
2. This country's participation is unconstitutional.
3. Participation is dangerously unwise as our' form of government is
threatened.
In the opinion of the writer of this note, the authorities cited in note 51 supra
have succeeded in refuting these charges.
1 HOLEs, THE COMIMON LAW 246 (1881); POLLOCK & WRIGHT, POSSES-
SION IN THE CoviazoN LAW 93 (1888); RESTATEMAENT, TORTS § 895 (1939).2 Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294, 53 N. W. 636 (1892); accord, New
England Box Co. v. C & R Const. Co., 313 Mass. 696, 49 N. E. 2d 121 (1943).
3 Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722); Deader-
ick v. Aulds, 86 Tenn. 14, 5 S. V. 487 (1887).
4 Webb v. Fox, 7 Term Reports 392, 397, 101 Eng. Rep. 1037, 1040 (1797).
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